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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf Department 
of Human Services, ex rel. 
DIANA W. MOBLEY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
GEORGE C. MOBLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930299-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 78-2a-
3(2)(h) and 78-45-10 (1993) which allow appeals from orders and 
judgments under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following statutes and Rules are contained in 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12.1(5). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 63(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the lower court complied with the procedures 
mandated by Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in ruling on 
the Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge submitted by Mr. Mobley. 
Standard of Review: No deference is accorded the trial court 
on questions of procedure. Barnard v. Murphy, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19 (Utah App. 1993) . 
B. Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient 
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to find Mr. Mobley in contempt. 
Standard of Review: Findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a). 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
C. Whether the lower court's order finding Mr. Mobley in 
contempt was a civil contempt order such that criminal rules of 
procedure were inapplicable. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which this 
Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's determination. Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 
1095 (Utah 1990) . 
D. Whether Mr. Mobley's argument that his 19 89 child support 
order violates the United States Constitution is properly before 
the Court on this appeal. 
Standard of Review: This question is raised here for the 
first time and presents a question of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Diana and George Mobley were divorced on August 17, 1989. 
(R.83). At the divorce trial on July 18, 1989, the* parties reached 
a Stipulation in chambers in conjunction with a proffer of 
evidence. (R.71). The Court found that Mrs. Mobley earned 
$1,426.00 per month. Mr. Mobley argued that he had no income, was 
employed by Innovation Specialties and was unwilling to change 
employment to obtain income. (R.77). The Court found that Mr. 
Mobley's historical income was $37,102.00 in 1985; $42,950 in 1986; 
$45,700 in 1987; $43,305 in 1988 for a total of $167,057. The 
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yearly average was $41,764.00 and monthly average was $3,480.00. 
(R.75-80). The Court ordered child support at $224.00 per child 
for the Mobley's four children. (R.78). The Court also ordered 
alimony at $603.00 per month. (R.79). 
The State of Utah, Department of Human Services, was joined as 
a party to this action on December 26, 1989. (R.85). On the 
State's motion, an Order to Show Cause was issued to Mr. Mobley for 
failure pay to his court-ordered child support. (R.104-106). On 
January 20, 199 3, Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett conducted the Order 
to Show Cause hearing. Commissioner Arnett recommended that the 
issue of contempt be certified for hearing before Judge Rokich. 
(R.114). Mr. Mobley objected to the Commissioner's Recommendations 
on January 29, 1993 (R.115) and filed a Notice to Submit on 
February 1, 1993. (R.123). The State filed a Notice of 
Evidentiary Hearing on February 2, 1993. (R.125). An Order on the 
Order to Show Cause was entered against Mr. Mobley on February 10, 
1993 by Judge John A. Rokich. This Order entered a judgment in 
favor of Mrs. Mobley for $22,696.30 for alimony from August 1989 to 
November 1992, for $42,502.79 for child support arrears from 
January 1989 through November 1992, and certified the issue of 
contempt for a hearing before Judge Rokich. (R.130). 
On February 19, 1993, the contempt hearing was set for March 
12, 1993 (R.165). At the March 12 hearing, the matter was 
continued March 30, 1993. (R.167). On March 29, 1993, Mr. Mobley 
filed his Affidavit for the Removal of a Judge (R.276) and a Motion 
to Continue. (R.290). 
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The grounds for Mr, Mobley's request for removal were that he 
believed that Judge Rokich had shown a "consistent bias against the 
defendant. . . because of his pro-se status and other unknown 
reasons." (R.276). In making his argument regarding the Judge's 
alleged bias, Mr, Mobley referred back to certain statements and 
decisions made by the Judge at the time of the original divorce 
trial. (R.276-277). Mr. Mobley also complained of the Judge's 
statements which were made at the March 12, 1993 hearing. (R.278). 
On March 30, 19 93, the Court conducted a contempt hearing and 
found Mr. Mobley in contempt and ordered him to jail for 30 days 
beginning immediately. (R.324). On April 2, 1993, the Court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R.344). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court did not properly comply with the procedures 
mandated by Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the 
treatment of the Affidavit for Removal of the judge which was 
submitted by Mr. Mobley. The lower court's Findings of Fact were 
sufficient to support a contempt order. The Court found that Mr. 
Mobley knew what was ordered, had the ability to comply with the 
order, and willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
The contempt hearing was civil in nature and complied with the 
due process requirements of such a proceeding. Even though 
imprisonment was ordered, Mr. Mobley was afforded the opportunity 
to purge himself of the contempt. Because of the conditional 
nature of the imprisonment, the contempt was civil in nature. 
The issue that the imputation of income to Mr. Mobley was 
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unconstitutional is not properly before this Court since the 
Defendant did not properly appeal his 1989 child support court 
order in a timely fashion and he cannot challenge it now in this 
unrelated appeal, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT PROPERLY COMPLY WITH THE 
PROCEDURES MANDATED BY RULE 63(B) IN RULING ON MR. 
MOBLEY'S AFFIDAVIT FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE JUDGE. 
On March 29, 1993, one day before his contempt hearing, Mr. 
Mobley filed his "Affidavit for Removal of a Judge," pursuant to 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.00276). In his 
affidavit he raised the alleged bias of the judge at his 1989 
divorce trial and he also raised the judge's alleged bias at the 
March 12, 1993 hearing. That portion of Mr. Mobley's Affidavit 
which protested the judge's asserted bias from the 1989 hearing was 
untimely since he had known of those facts for four years and had 
never raised them. However, the remainder of the allegations of 
bias raised in the March 29 affidavit referred to the trial judge's 
conduct at the March 12, 1993 hearing. Mr. Mobley's affidavit of 
bias was filed seventeen days after the March 12 hearing and one 
day before the scheduled contempt hearing before the same judge. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires an 
affidavit "shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known." While the Rule 
sets no time limitation, timeliness is still essential. To be 
timely, the affidavit should be filed at the first opportunity 
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after discovery of the disqualifying facts. See Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988). The 
court should not even consider an untimely motion unless the 
affiant demonstrates good cause in the affidavit. J[d. at 543. 
In Madsen, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's motion 
under Rule 63(b) was not timely filed because the defendant waited 
39 days after the asserted prejudicial statements made by the judge 
to file his Rule 63(b) motion. The Court held that the Defendant 
"failed to act with sufficient promptness in a matter which by its 
very nature, requires promptness." _Icl. at 544. The Court 
indicated that an affidavit of prejudice and motion to disqualify 
should have taken no more than ten days to prepare and file. 
However, the defendant in Madsen was represented by counsel. In 
the present case, Mr. Mobley was proceeding pro se and, as pointed 
out in his brief, he filed his affidavit prior to the pending 
hearing and did attempt to comply with the provisions of Rule 
63(b), The State agrees with Mr. Mobley that the trial court did 
not comply with the procedures mandated by Rule 63(b) when it did 
not certify Mr. Mobley7s affidavit of bias to another judge for a 
ruling on its legal sufficiency and that a remand on that issue 
would be appropriate. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTEMPT 
ISSUE WERE SUFFICIENT. 
Mr. Mobley argues that the lower court's findings and 
conclusions do not sufficiently support its order of contempt. 
Even if the findings are inadequate or unclear, the insufficiency 
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does not amount to a constitutional error nor does it violate Mr. 
Mobley's right to due process. If the Findings of Fact are not 
sufficiently detailed to resolve the dispute, the trial judgment 
should be vacated and remanded for additional findings. Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 1979). It is not the function of 
the appellate court to make findings of fact. Id. 
In contempt hearings, the appellate court accepts the trial 
court's Findings of Fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). The contemnor 
must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court, the evidence was insufficient to 
support the findings. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assn. v. Labrum, 762 
P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); West Valley City v. Borrego, 752 P.2d 361 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
Mr. Mobley argues that he is excused from marshaling the facts 
because the findings were insufficiently detailed to include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the decision was 
reached. Whether the findings are written separately or whether 
they are gleaned from the transcript, "the ultimate test of the 
adequacy of a trial judge's finding is whether they are 
sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide 
a basis for decision." State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
A finding of contempt and the imposition of a jail sentence 
must be supported by proof that the contemnor (1) knew what was 
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required by previous court order, (2) had the ability to comply 
with such order, and (3) willfully and knowingly failed and refused 
to do so. Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P. 2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1983). 
The Court found Mr. Mobley in contempt and sentenced him to jail 
for thirty (30) days. On the record, the Court stated that "he 
[Mr. Mobley] failed to make payment; he has the ability to pay and 
has refused to acknowledge his obligation to provide for his 
family" (R.378). In its written findings, the Court found that 
Mr. Mobley knew of his child support and alimony obligations; was 
self employed in the printing industry; and willingly and knowingly 
failed or refused to honor the court order. (R.341). The Court 
also found that Mr. Mobley had not paid child support since June 
1990 and he owed $44,742.79 for child support and $25,711.30 for 
alimony. (R.341), In addition, Mr. Mobley offered no reasonable 
explanation for failure to pay child support and the Court was of 
the opinion that no just cause existed for such a failure. 
(R.341). These findings directly support the Court's conclusions 
that Mr. Mobley was in contempt. If this Court determines that 
these findings are not sufficiently detailed to support the lower 
court's order, then this case should be remanded to the trial court 
to make a more detailed Findings of Fact. 
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POINT III 
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS CIVIL IN NATURE AND DID NOT 
VIOLATE MR, MOBLEY'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
In order for the Court to hold Mr. Mobley in contempt for 
failure to comply with a court order, it had to find that he "knew 
what was required, (2) had the ability to comply and (3) 
intentionally failed or refused to do so." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 
P.2d, 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). These three elements must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal contempt and by clear and 
convincing evidence in civil contempt. Id. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the Court found that "he [Mr. 
Mobley] failed to make payment; he has the ability to pay and has 
refused to acknowledge his obligation to provide for his family," 
(R.378). In its written findings the Court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
1. Defendant knows, and has known since the entry of his 
Decree of Divorce, that his monthly child support 
obligation is $224.00 per month per child for his four 
children. 
2. The Defendant knows, and has known since the entry of 
his Decree of Divorce, that his monthly alimony 
obligation is $603,00 per month. 
3. The Defendant is self-employed in the printing 
industry in which he produces tickets for various events. 
4. The Defendant willingly and knowingly fails or 
refuses to honor the court order. 
5. The child support arrearage from January 1989 through 
March 1993 totals $44,742.79. 
6. The alimony arrearage from August 1989 through March 
1993 totals $25, 711.30. 
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7. The Defendant has not paid child support or alimony 
since June, 1990. 
8. The Defendant has offered no reasonable explanation 
for his failure to make his child support payments and 
the court finds that no just cause exists. 
9. The Defendant is in contempt of court. 
(R.340). 
Mr. Mobley argues that his due process rights were violated 
when the Court failed to address the issues of whether the contempt 
was direct or indirect and whether it was civil or criminal. 
However, no case law requires the court to specifically rule on 
these issues. The Court simply needs to properly adjudicate the 
proceedings with the correct procedural protections. 
A. Defendant's contempt was indirect. 
The State agrees with Mr. Mobley that the contempt in this 
case is indirect. Indirect contempt is committed outside the 
presence of the court, where the Defendant refuses to comply with 
a prior court order. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 
1988). However, the State does not agree that Mr. Mobley's due 
process rights were violated. In a proceeding for indirect 
contempt, due process requires that the person charged be advised 
of the nature of the action, have assistance of counsel, if 
requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and have the right 
to offer testimony on his behalf. Von Hake, 759 P. 2d at 1170. 
These due process protections are codified in Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-
32-3 (1951) which requires, that for a charge of indirect contempt, 
an affidavit must be presented to the Court reciting the facts 
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constituting contempt in order to ensure that the person charged is 
informed of the conduct alleged to be contemptuous. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Mobley knew of the impending contempt charge 
when he was personally served with the State's Motion, Affidavit, 
and Order to Show Cause on December 11, 1992. The Affidavit 
accompanying the Motion for Order to Show Cause demonstrated to the 
court that Mr. Mobley had violated the prior court order. Coleman 
v. Coleman, 664 P. 2d at 1157. It sufficiently stated the acts done 
or omitted in violation of the order of the Court. The ability to 
pay is a matter of defense and the burden of proof is upon the 
Defendant in the contempt proceeding. DeYonge v. DeYonge, 135 P. 2d 
905 (Utah 1943). Mr. Mobley did not show that he had the inability 
to pay. He simply showed that he refused to work at a job that 
paid him on a consistent basis. 
It is only after the defendant presents evidence of 
justification for his failure to perform that the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff. Coleman, 664 P. 2d at 1157. Mr. Mobley 
responded to the issue of contempt in his written response filed 
with the Court at the Order to Show Cause hearing on January 20, 
1993 before the Commissioner. He also submitted Exhibits with his 
written objection. Therefore, the due process requirements in an 
indirect contempt proceeding were satisfied. 
B. The contempt proceeding was civil and not criminal in 
nature. 
In this case, the contempt proceeding was civil and not 
criminal in nature because the purpose of the proceeding was to 
coerce Mr. Mobley into obeying the court order to support his 
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children. If the State intended to punish Mr. Mobley it could have 
prosecuted him under the criminal nonsupport statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1993) . 
Mr. Mobley claims that the contempt proceeding was criminal in 
nature rather than civil. Criminal contempt is afforded greater 
safeguards in the contempt proceeding. Hicks ex rei. Feiock v. 
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). Civil 
contempt differs from criminal contempt in both purpose and 
procedure. A contempt order is criminal, if its purpose is to 
vindicate the authority of the court by punishing an individual for 
disobeying an order, even if the order arises from civil 
proceedings. Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168-6 9. However, a contempt 
order is civil if it has a remedial purpose, such as to coerce an 
individual into complying with the court order. Id. 
It is the purpose and not the method of punishment which 
distinguishes the two types of proceedings. The imprisonment is 
remedial if the contemnor remains imprisoned unless and until he 
performs the act required by the court but if the imprisonment is 
for a definite period despite a purge, it is punitive. Boggs v. 
Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-12 allows imprisonment for civil 
contempt proceedings so long as it is remedial in nature and 
conditional in that the Defendant is afforded the opportunity to 
purge the contempt. _Id. A reading of the transcript and the 
written findings in this case implicitly shows that the 
imprisonment was conditional upon Mr. Mobley even attempting to 
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support his family by obtaining a paying job. 
Whether the findings are written separately, 
or whether they are gleaned from the 
transcript, the opinion or the memorandum 
decision, the ultimate test of the adequacy of 
the findings is whether they are sufficiently 
comprehensive and pertinent to issues to 
provide a basis for the decision. 
State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1991). 
Repeatedly, Mr. Mobley had announced to the Court that he had 
no intention of abiding by the Court's order of child support. 
Above Mr. Mobley's protestations at the divorce trial, the Court 
stated that he needed to find a job that paid money in order to 
support his family despite the many hours he invested in his 
current business. (R.367). Where conditions of the contempt order 
are unstated, so long as the contemnor understands them to exist, 
the contempt is considered civil. United States v. Aver, 806 F.2d 
571, 573 (2d Cir. 1989). Therefore, the indirect contempt order 
was civil in nature and the procedure used in issuing the order did 
not violate Mr. Mobley's due process rights. 
POINT IV 
MR. MOBLEY'S CONTENTION THAT HIS CHILD SUPPORT ORDER 
VIOLATES THE 13TH AMENDMENT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT. 
In his written Memoranda filed before the trial Court 
(R.00170), and in his Appellant's brief, Mr. Mobley contends that 
imputing income creates an obligation of work; since, if he does 
not work, the Court presumes willful refusal to pay. Thus, Mr. 
Mobley argues, if the Court enforces its order to pay through 
criminal contempt powers, it violates the Thirteenth Amendment and 
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its enabling legislation, 42 U.S.C. § 1994, abolishing the system 
of peonage. 
The validity of the 19 89 child support order which imputed 
income tc Mr. Mobley, based on historical earnings, has never been 
properly appealed to this Court nor has a request, for modification 
of the court order been sought in the lower court. His peonage 
argument is a belated attempt to further contest an issue 
previously adjudicated in the Divorce Decree. Mr. Mobley has never 
moved to set aside the child support amount set in the Divorce 
Decree under Rule 6 0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor has 
he filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-45-7.2 and 30-3-5(3). Claims not raised by a party 
in the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Bangerter v. Polton, 663 P. 2d 100 (Utah 1983). 
An order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and over the person must be obeyed until it is reversed, 
modified or set aside by orderly and proper proceedings. Goetz v. 
Goetz, 309 P. 2d 655 (Kansas 1957). A contempt proceeding does not 
open to reconsideration the basis of the order at issue and thus 
become a retrial of the original controversy. Maqqio v. Zeitz, 333 
U.S. 56; 92 L.Ed 476, 68 S.Ct. 401 (1948). See also Burgers v. 
Maiben, 552 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). A contempt proceeding is 
separate from the action out of which the alleged .contemptuous 
conduct arose. Jones v. Cox, 37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934), Robinson v. 
City Court ex rel. City of Qqden, 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947). Cf. 
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988). 
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A court's order may be erroneous but it is still enforceable 
pursuant to a contempt proceeding if not overturned by a higher 
court after a timely appeal Therefore, Mr. Mobley's argument is 
not properly before the court and should not be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court did not comply with the procedures mandated by 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure so the issue of the 
bias of the lower court judge should be remanded for a proper 
consideration pursuant to Rule 63. The court's Findings of Fact 
sufficiently support the order of contempt. Additionally, Mr. 
Mobley's due process rights were not violated by the order of 
contempt nor by its order of imprisonment. Mr. Mobley's attempt to 
challenge in this appeal his 1989 child support court order is not 
properly before this Court and should not be considered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /y? day of November, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
:. SAPE&STEIN STEPHANIE M, 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann, 30-3-5(31 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property of the custodial parent. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-32-12,1(5) 
If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an 
obligor, as defined in Section 78-45-2, has refused to pay child 
support as ordered by a court in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 
45, Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the court may order 
the obligor to: 
(a) perform community service; and 
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or individual 
counseling to educate the obligor about the importance of complying 
with the court order providing the children with a regular and 
stable source of support. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b) 
Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file 
an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding 
is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against 
such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the 
belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as 
soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or such bias 
or prejudice is known. If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter 
an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to 
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like 
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency of 
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called 
in to try the case or determine the matter in question. No party 
shall be entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit; and 
no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a 
certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and 
application are made in good faith. 
